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THE PROBLEM OF DIRTY HANDS

Leslie Griffin

ABSTRACT

This essay examines what Sartre called the problem of "dirty hands" as it
applies to two issues in contemporary Catholic discussions of political
morality. Beginning with Michael Walzer's work on dirty hands, the essa
next identifies four approaches to this problem characteristic of Christian
ethics. These four categories are then applied to analysis of two issues:
conflicts of conscience that may confront Catholic politicians as a result o
the responsibilities of public office and the church's exclusion of clergy and
religious from holding public office.

In his play, Dirty Hands, Jean-Paul Sartre juxtaposes two men wi

conflicting views of political life. Hoederer, the party's chief, desires pow

to help him attain his party's goals and will use any available means
attain his ends. The man who plans to assassinate him, Hugo, is sicke
by what he perceives as treachery in Hoederer 's actions, for Hugo v
Hoederer's double-dealing tactics as a compromise of the purity of
party's position. Their discussion throughout Sartre's play is instruct
about the nature of political morality, but one statement by Hoedere
Hugo is particularly illuminating:

How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you are to soil you

hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it do? Why did you join us? Purit

is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals and bourgeois anarchists
use it as a pretext for doing nothing. To do nothing, to remain motionless
arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, / have dirty hands. Right up to
the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood.

And he leaves Hugo with the question that continues to plague p

losophers, theologians and politicians - the so-called problem of dir
hands - "Do you think you can govern innocently?" (Sartre, 1949:222
While Hugo and Hoederer may not be helpful exemplars of politi
choice in the current North American context, contemporary discus
about political morality in the United States demonstrate that Hoede
question remains problematical. For the situations which the politic
confronts daily - the deployment of military or police force, or the
31
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32 The Journal of Religious Ethics
semination or withholding of information to the public, for example provoke serious questions about the possibility of moral action by the
politician. A further complication is added when politicians subscribe to
religious beliefs which influence their moral outlooks and their political
choices.

In recent years, the problematical relationship among political, religious and moral commitments has been quite evident in the controversies
surrounding certain prominent Roman Catholic politicians. Two major
issues have confronted those interested in the relationship between Roman
Catholicism and political morality. The first of these involves the consciences of Catholic politicians (like Mario Cuomo and Geraldine Ferraro)
who seek to combine Catholic faith with public office. The second of these
concerns the exclusion of Roman Catholic clergy (like Robert Drinan) and
religious from political office.

My argument in this essay is that contemporary Catholic discussions of
these two subjects can profit from a careful analysis of what philosophers
and theologians, in response to Sartre's play, have entitled the "problem of
dirty hands." My focus here will be on discussions of political morality in
Christian ethics. In particular, after a brief discussion of Michael Walzer's
work on dirty hands, I will identify four approaches to the problem of dirty
hands characteristic of Christian ethics. I will argue that careful reflection

on the differences in these approaches can shed some light on current
Roman Catholic discussions of the morality of individual politicians and
on the exclusion of priests and religious from political office and can
provide some clear guidelines for a Roman Catholic political ethic.

MICHAEL WALZER AND THE PROBLEM OF DIRTY HANDS

In his article, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,"
Walzer (1978) (in response to an ongoing discussion among R. B
R. M. Hare, and Thomas Nagel)1 identifies three possible resolu

the problem of dirty hands, one of which he supports. As the basis

interpretation of this problem, Walzer proposes three understa
rules and moral actions. Walzer rejects the first two as inadeq
supports the third.

The first view of moral rules is that they do not exist. Perso
overcome their personal inhibitions toward certain types of a
there are no actions which are outlawed. The morality of every
determined by its circumstances and consequences. The decisio
can make mistakes, but cannot commit crimes. Walzer rejects th
standing of morality; humans are, he says, situated in a social c
their decision-making, which provides them with rules: "Mora
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social phenomenon, and it is constituted at least in part by rules, the
knowing of which ... we share with our fellows" (Walzer, 1978:107).
Walzer parts company as well with those who argue the second position, that moral rules are summary rules, helpful guidelines about past
experience, which can be overridden in cases (of one's own choosing) to
which they do not apply. The fact that persons defend themselves when
they break the rules, Walzer says, shows that rules have some prior status.

The insistence on this prior status leads Walzer to propose a third
understanding of rules, i.e., that when humans break rules they know they

have done something wrong, even if their action was the best thing to do
under the circumstances. In other words, humans experience guilt. Rules,
then, are important, and guilt serves a useful purpose in preventing persons from breaking the rules too easily. Guilt also shows that persons are
"good," in that they regret having to undertake certain actions. Walzer's
belief in rules and in the guilt attached to breaking rules causes him to
support the idea of dirty hands (that is, that the politician cannot remain
innocent, cannot "keep her hands clean").
Walzer links his analysis of moral rules to certain philosophical and
theological predecessors. He identifies three strands of thinking about the
problem of dirty hands: neoclassical, Protestant and Catholic. The first
category is represented by Machiavelli. Machiavelli had moral standards,
states Walzer, because he recognized that some actions are good and some
bad. The goal of Machiavelli's leader, however, is to "learn how not to be
good," and how to work for the best pragmatic results. Efficiency outweighs morality. The problem with this neoclassical view, according to
Walzer, is that the Machiavellian hero has no "inwardness," that is, no
state of anguish or guilt about his behavior. Humans think that such a
politician should show signs of guilt, says Walzer.
In Walzer's second category, represented by Max Weber's tragic hero,
the politician is indeed in anguish. Weber's politician is a suffering servant

who is doomed by his political vocation. He must choose politics over
love. He knows that he is damned, that God cannot justify his acts.
Nevertheless, he must act as a politician. The problem with this Protestant
category, states Walzer, is that Weber's suffering servant is either a masochist or a hypocrite. His punishment and his guilt remain too individual,
too self-inflicted. Walzer thinks citizens want the politician to be responsi-

ble to some kind of social punishment; he also believes that we do not
want to be governed by a politician who has lost her soul.
Walzer thinks the third category is the most effective of the three in
dealing with the problem of dirty hands. The representative of this Catho-

lic position is Albert Camus. Camus' "just assassins" undertake their
crime, but they are prepared to be punished for their actions. Walzer finds
this a satisfactory condition for their action, for it requires an appropriate
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punishment to fit the crime which has taken place. The Machiavellian has
no one to control him; the Weberian has only herself. But in the third
model society exists to punish the politician. Once she has undergone the
penalty, her hands are clean again. Punishment is enforced to guard
politicians against breaking the rules too easily. "They override the rules
without ever being certain that they have found the best way to the results
they hope to achieve, and we don't want them to do that too quickly or too

often. So it is important that the moral stakes be very high - which is to
say, that the rules be rightly valued" (Walzer, 1978: 120). 2
Part of Walzer's acceptance of the concept of dirty hands is based on his
belief that political action is different from behavior in the private sector
for three reasons. The first of these is that the politician acts in the name of

others (the citizens whom she governs) but that she also acts on her own
behalf. The tension between these responsibilities makes political decision-making difficult and complex. Second, politicians are subject to the
pleasures of ruling. The third characteristic is that politicians have the
potential to enforce their decisions and even to use violence, if they so
wish.

Illustrative of Walzer's opinions about political morality is a test case he
constructs. Should a politician committed to establishing peace and order
use torture to find out the location of bombs planted by a rebel leader?
Torture, in Walzer's view, is the right decision, but "When he ordered the
prisoner tortured, he committed a moral crime and he accepted a moral
burden. Now he is a guilty man." But guilt is the only sign "that he is not

too good for politics and that he is good enough. Here is the moral
politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral
man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician

and nothing else, he would pretend that they were clean" (Walzer, 1978:
105).

In his suggestive conclusion, Walzer asserts that "we might see to it
that fewer lies were told if we contrived to deny power and glory to the
greatest liars - except, of course, in the case of those lucky few whose
extraordinary achievements make us forget the lies they told" (Walzer,
1978:120).
In a later book, Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer adverts to his earlier
treatment of dirty hands when he identifies the "supreme emergency"
criteria of his just war theory. Walzer argues (1977:254) that supreme
emergencies "bring us under the rule of necessity (and necessity knows no
rules)." In supreme emergencies, the decision-maker might be required to
override the important principle of non-combatant immunity. But in doing

so one must "accept the burdens of criminality" (1977:260), "acknowledge
that one has also been forced to kill the innocent" (1977:261), and admit
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that this "is a kind of blasphemy against our deepest moral commitments"
(1977:263).
In the last chapter of this book, Walzer explores the morality of the men
and women - the military and political leaders - who violate non-combatant immunity out of necessity. And Walzer argues - as he did in his dirty
hands article - both that we want to have leaders who will do what is

necessary and that we cannot ignore the horrors of what they do:
The deliberate killing of the innocent is murder. Sometimes, in conditions of
extremity . . . commanders must commit murder or they must order others

to commit it. And then they are murderers, though in a good cause. In
domestic society, and particularly in the context of revolutionary politics, we
say of such people that they have dirty hands. I have argued elsewhere that
men and women with dirty hands, though it may be the case that they have

acted well and done what their office required, must nonetheless bear a
burden of responsibility and guilt. (Walzer, 1977:323)

As an instance of such guilt, Walzer describes the case of Arthur
Harris, commander of the British Bomber Command in England in the
Second World War, who was not honored by his country after the war.
Even though Harris' bombing was necessary, Walzer agrees that it is
important not to offer him public praise or recognition: "a nation fighting a

just war, when it is desperate and survival itself is at risk, must use
unscrupulous or morally ignorant soldiers; and as soon as their usefulness
is past, it must disown them" (1977:325).
Leaders, Walzer argues, cannot ask their citizens to be proud of such
tactics. Supreme emergency, then, provides an apt illustration of Michael
Walzer's understanding of the dirty hands of the politician.

While Walzer's categories present a helpful analysis of the problem of
dirty hands and remind us of the importance of the discussion of rules to
questions of political morality, it seems to me that his "Protestant" and
"Catholic" categories do not fairly represent the theological responses
characteristic of Protestantism and Catholicism. Nor are his categories
sufficient for Christians struggling with issues of personal conscience and
public morality. I think that one can identify four, not two, characteristic
approaches to the morality of politicians in the Christian tradition. Each
includes a distinctive description of the moral life and of moral norms. I
entitle the four positions moral purity, moral anguish, dual morality, and
common morality.3
These four positions represent different ways of thinking about the
morality of the politician. To illustrate the moral reasoning characteristic
of these four approaches, I have chosen certain authors I find representative of these types of argument. At times, in my treatment of these writers,
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I have limited my analysis to only one of their works. I recognize that
other writings might place an author in a different location, and some
writers could be described as representative of more than one category.
My aim, however, is not to place authors in models, but to illuminate
different arguments, different ideas, or different ways of speaking about
the morality of the politician.

Such a project inevitably encounters the limitations of any attempt to
link specific authors to specific types of argument. Nonetheless, I do think
that the categories themselves can be helpful to a general discussion of the

morality of the politician in Christian ethics. And, in particular, in this
article I will argue that they shed light on contemporary Roman Catholic
discussions about politics and ethics.

MORAL PURITY4

My first model can be understood as offering primarily a deontologic
approach to ethics. This deontological argument rules out certain activities as inappropriate for the politician. In doing so, it argues that there

is one morality available to all Christians, and there is no separate mora

ity applicable to politicians only. This one morality which rules out certain
activities for all Christians may be ineffective or effective, but it argues th

efficacy is not what should determine one's moral choices. To use the

terminology of Walzer, the moral purity model argues that one should, as a

Christian, keep one's hands clean.5
The moral reasoning of this category is the type illustrated in Augustine's (1975) prohibition against lying in his treatises "On Lying" an
"Against Lying," (but certainly not demonstrated in all of Augustine
moral arguments, e.g., on just war). For Augustine, lying is always wron
no matter what circumstances surround it. Although he admits that the
are times when other duties seem to overrule the necessity of telling th

truth, he refuses to accept the force of these arguments. He stands firm in

his belief that lying cannot be permitted. Some lies are more serious th
others, but they are all wrong. Augustine would not care if beneficia
political activities were aided by the lie, for his concern is for the etern
welfare of the soul of the individual who chooses to lie. For Augustine,

temporal benefit can justify an activity which can, by its very nature, harm
one's immortal soul.6

One of the clearest contemporary formulations of this first model's
perspective on Christian ethics is found in John Howard Yoder's (1964)
espousal of pacifism, of an ethic of non-resistance.7 At the heart of Yoder's

ethic is what one could refer to as a deontological model (although he
himself would resist that language, or at least say that such language was
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not a sufficient description of his position), for it is fundamentally rooted

in obedience and in absolute fidelity to Jesus Christ. Followers of Jesus
Christ should learn about their ethic by looking to the behavior of Jesus
himself; for Christian ethics must "be rooted in revelation, not alone in
speculation, nor in a self-interpreting 'situation'" (Yoder, 1972:239; see
alsoYoder, 1984:116).
Focusing on this life of Jesus Christ provides Yoder with (at least) an
ethic of non-resistance.8 Yoder establishes a negative norm against violent
resistance grounded in the example of Jesus Christ. Jesus faced in his life
the temptation of using violent means to bring about political change. But
he rejected them, as should his followers. Yoder argues, "If Christ is who
the texts say he is, no one gathering around him can affirm a mandate to
kill or to oppress" (Yoder, 1984:118; cf. Yoder, 1972:98-100; 1964:44).
Because of his insistence on obedience to Jesus Christ, Yoder rejects a
so-called "ethics of responsibility" which argues for greater participation
in politics for Christians, including possible use of violence. Such ethics
arose in Christianity during the Constantinian era, he argues, and possess
two major characteristics. First, they strive for universality; second, they
are concerned with consequences or with effectiveness. These dual concerns distort the true Christian ethic, according to Yoder. For in making

the ethic applicable to all persons, one loses the specific content of
Christian ethics which obligates all Christians to obedience. And, in
accepting effectiveness as a goal, Christians allow themselves to compromise with evil, to accept "lesser evils" in a way that Jesus did not. The
cross, after all, does not testify to an ethic of efficacy.
This should not lead one to conclude that Yoder concedes that his own

ethic is ineffective. Rather, he argues in a number of his writings that his

ethic of obedience could be effective.9 But that is not why Christians
choose obedience. They choose it because they wish to be faithful to Jesus
Christ.

Two final points merit our attention for the problem of dirty hands.
First, Yoder insists (n.d.: 31-33) that his own description of a Christian
social ethic (and the sectarian tradition in general) has been caricatured as
an ethic of irresponsibility and as one which advocates total withdrawal
from society. But Yoder never, in fact, advocates that Christians be totally

removed from society or from politics. For example, Christian participa-

tion in the nation's policing forces could be accepted, or some active
involvement in the legislative and elective processes, if the legislator
could avoid being an "agent of power" (Yoder, 1964:27), could be permitted. But here again, participation is limited - or better bounded - by obedience to Jesus Christ. It is Jesus who provides the model for this type of
involvement, for he avoided both extremes of political activity. He neither

withdrew from political responsibility nor allied himself with the con-
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servative order; he avoided "both quietism and establishment responsibility" (Yoder, 1972:98).
Second, Yoder argues that Christian ethics has focused too narrowly on
the morality of the ruler or of the politician; Christian social ethics has
become an analysis of what people in power should do. Yoder argues that
this is the wrong paradigm for Christian ethics. Christian social ethics
should not require us to imagine ourselves in the place of the politician, to
envision what she or he should do, and then to vote accordingly. Christian
social ethics must not undertake a "What would you do if you were Henry
Kissinger?" (Yoder 1984:162; see also Yoder, 1984:138; 1972:157) process.
For the place of the Christian is with the oppressed. And so the paradigm
for the Christian is to place herself with the powerless and the poor. The
Christian ethic should be one not of dominion, but of service and servanthood.

Too much focus on the politician's dirty or clean hands, therefore, will
shift Christian attention from the community and the community's calling
to be ever critical of the state, of political life, and of political institutions.

MORAL ANGUISH

The second response to the dilemma of dirty hands, which I call

"moral anguish" model, differs from the first model in a number of wa

It argues that there are two moralities, one for the private individua
one for the politician (or more precisely, one morality and one im
ality). It urges as well that action undertaken in the political arena s
be responsible, i.e., effective (and suggests that backers of the first m
are irresponsible, so concerned with moral purity that they accom

nothing). Its approach to ethics in the sphere of politics is co

sequentialist. To be responsible, the politician must do what is neces
to bring about the best ends, but these actions are frequently immo
Nonetheless, the politician must undertake these immoral actions, bu
is guilty (i.e., her hands are dirty) when she does so. And politicians
be willing to pay the price - whether through internal guilt or exte
punishment - for these transgressions.10

As Walzer notes, Max Weber's essay, "Politics as a Vocation," prese

a striking example of the arguments of this category. Weber describes t
conflict between the realm of the saint and the realm of the politician,
he contrasts an ethic of ultimate ends with an ethic of responsibility. In

ethic of ultimate ends, Weber believes one is concerned only with

purity of her own morals. Weber supports an ethic of responsibility for

politician, who must choose "morally dubious means or at least

gerous ones," all the while "facing the possibility or even the proba
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of evil ramifications" (Weber, 1958:121). For all those who engage in
politics must recognize that they open themselves to the influence of
"diabolic forces."

He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not
seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics

can only be solved by violence. The genius or demon of politics lives in an
inner tension with the god of love, as well as with the Christian God as
expressed by the church. This tension can at any time lead to an irreconcilable conflict (Weber, 1958:126).

Weber commends Machiavelli's agent who chooses the welfare of his city
over the welfare of his own soul. The choice to be immoral in public life is
a tragic, but necessary, one, for in making it the individual loses all hope of

salvation. Politics is a vocation, but the politician is not called by God.
Instead, Weber's hero chooses his own fate. He chooses politics and turns
away from love. 1 1

One theologian whose work illustrates this type of approach to ethics is
Dietrich Bonhoeffer - at least the post-Cost of Disciple ship Bonhoeffer,
the Bonhoeffer of the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler (for a different view

of Bonhoeffer's decision, see Goldberg, 1986:3-4). Bonhoeffer's focus
here is not, strictly speaking, the problem of dirty hands, since he is
concerned with the actions of those plotting to overthrow a government
rather than with the actions of politicians themselves. Nonetheless, his
description of Christian ethics can help us to comprehend the vision of
Christian ethics representative of the second model.12
Bonhoeffer centers his ethic on Jesus Christ and on the need for the

Christian to listen to the divine command of God through Jesus Christ.
But Bonhoeffer does not understand obedience to Jesus Christ as cen-

tered in the adherence of the individual to certain moral norms. In fact, the

claim of Jesus Christ upon us "comes to us from without" (Bonhoeffer,
1955:218; see also Rasmussen, 1972) and does not allow Christians to set
up a system of moral absolutes.
Instead, Bonhoeffer urges Christians to pursue an ethic of responsibility, a responsibility in which humans act in freedom and in which
"obligation assumes the form of deputy ship and of correspondence with
reality" (Bonhoeffer, 1955:227). Responsibility and deputyship mean that
Christians cannot think of themselves as isolated individuals, but must be
concerned with the well-being of others, as Jesus was. Bonhoeffer also
urges (1955:227) that Christian responsibility cannot be "a matter of
principle, but it arises with the given situation." Thus the Christian cannot

be concerned with the development of systems of ethics, cannot concern
herself with the pursuit of the "absolute good" but with the "relatively
better" (Bonhoeffer, 1955:227). Not deontological norms or moral abso-
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lutes, therefore, but instead a "contextualist ethic" (see Burtness, 1985,
for discussion of this ethic).
While Bonhoeffer allows for certain givens - the existence of the divine

mandates, e.g., or the "generally accepted moral principles of the life of

the state" which "no statesman can disregard . . . with impunity"

(Bonhoeffer, 1955:237) - he also believes that extraordinary situations can
arise. These kinds of cases cannot be settled by appeals to law but depend
upon the free responsibility of the statesman to settle them - perhaps by
breaking the law. For example, Bonhoeffer vehemently rejects Kant's
absolute prohibition against lying, presenting instead a shifting, relative,
contextual notion of what truth itself means (Bonhoeffer, 1955:363-72; cf.
Burtness, 1985:126-63).

Above all, the free and responsible agent is one who is willing to
"accept guilt" (Bonhoeffer, 1955:240), i.e., one who does not worry about
"being good," but focuses on loving the neighbor. As Jesus took the guilt
of others upon himself, so must his followers. Bonhoeffer (1955:241)

opposes the person who "sets his own personal innocence above his

responsibility for men; . . . real innocence shows itself precisely in a man's
entering into the fellowship of guilt for the sake of other men." This is the

attitude Bonhoeffer describes in his Letters and Papers from Prison. In
"After Ten Years," Bonhoeffer warns both against an ethic of duty and an
ethic of virtuousness. He opposes an ethic of duty because "no one who
confines himself to the limits of duty ever goes so far as to venture ... to
act in the only way that makes it possible to score a direct hit on evil and
defeat it." He opposes as well those who "flee from public altercation into
the sanctuary of private virtuousness. But anyone who does this must shut
his mouth and his eyes to the injustice around him. Only at the cost of self-

deception can he keep himself pure from the contamination arising from
responsible action" (Bonhoeffer, 1971:5).
The descriptions of Bonhoeffer's actions by his biographers and by
students of his thought illustrate this understanding of the Christian moral

life. For example, Eberhard Bethge describes Bonhoeffer's rejection of
pacifism: continued commitment to pacifism would endanger his co-conspirators, and martyrdom for pacifism was a refusal to be involved with
fellow Germans. Bethge argues that Bonhoeffer decided that it was "no
longer a matter of keeping one's reputation clean as a Christian, a pastor
and an individual, but of sacrificing everything, even one's reputation as a
Christian" (Bethge, 1975:123). In Larry Rasmussen's analysis of Letters
and Papers from Prison, he states that for Bonhoeffer, "While the man of
private virtue refuses to dirty his hands in the public arena, injustice will
roll on." And it is a process of dirtying one's hands, for "if in the process
he becomes a martyr he will not be a saintly martyr but a guilty one"
(Rasmussen, 1972:66, 52, my emphasis).
Too much focus on personal obedience to Jesus Christ, therefore, will
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shift Christian attention from its responsibility to the world and will allow
the continuation of unjust political institutions.

DUAL MORALITY

The third model is similar to the second. Yet there are still differences

significant enough, I think, to warrant distinguishing between them. The
third response to the dilemma of dirty hands, like the second, is primarily

consequentialist in its moral reasoning. It asserts as well that the public
realm is subject, by its very nature, to moral regulations different from
those of the private sphere. Therefore, there are two moralities, one for
private life, and one for political life. Moral choice in the public sphere is to

be directed toward the pursuit of effective consequences. What distinguishes it from model two is that it fails to emphasize the guilt of the
politician because of its emphasis on a second or different morality. The
politician's hands are dirty, but she is nonetheless not guilty. Adherents of

the third model wonder how the individual can be required to do something for which she will be judged guilty. They ask as well how the
individual can be punished, either internally or externally, for something
required by life in the political realm.

Walzer's discussion of Machiavelli provides some guidance about the
parameters of this category, but also some instructive differences about
the limits which prevent this theological category from being strictly
Machiavellian. In The Prince and the Discourses, Niccolo Machiavelli
rejects the belief that the ruler must obey moral laws. Instead, he teaches
that the good ruler is a man of virtu - of strength, courage and cunning.
Machiavelli 's prince is a ruler who governs with practical efficiency. His
goal is not to follow moral rules, but to provide for the best interests of his

state. One must be careful to recognize that Machiavelli does not abolish
the idea of morality. He still believes in a moral code for the individual,
that there are actions which are evil. But he does not believe that the ruler

should be good.
. . . [T]here is such a difference between the way we really live and the way
we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study the ideal will
learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation. Any man who tries to be
good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are
not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his post must learn how not to
be good, and use that knowledge, or refrain from using it, as necessity
requires. (Machiavelli, 1977:44-45, my emphasis)

Machiavelli does not believe that the moral code should be violated by
the ruler on a whim or for the sake of cruelty. For Machiavelli, being
immoral or cruel does not prove that one is a good ruler. Instead, immoral
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actions are tools which the ruler is entitled to use without reproach if
efficiency requires them and if good results verify their effectiveness.
Machiavelli's prince is never judged by the morality or immorality of his
actions, but by the effectiveness of his results. The shrewd ruler would
recognize that frequent cruel actions can jeopardize the stability of his
government by undermining his popularity.
Thus, the ruler's success depends on whether cruelty is used well or badly.
Cruelty can be described as well used (if it's permissible to say good words
about something which is evil in itself) when it is performed all at once, for
reasons of self-preservation; and when the acts are not repeated after that,
but rather are turned as much as possible to the advantage of the subjects.
Cruelty is badly used, when it is infrequent at first, but increases with time
instead of diminishing. (Machiavelli, 1977:27; see also Shklar, 1984:30-35,
for an analysis of Machiavelli, Montaigne and Montesquieu)

What distinguishes Machiavelli from the theological proponents of a
dual morality, I think, is the latter's attempt to place some limits on the
sphere of public morality and on the goal of effectiveness. Martin Luther's

writings illustrate in some ways this attempt and point as well to the
difference I see between categories two and three. In A Short History of
Ethics, Alasdair Maclntyre describes both Luther and Machiavelli as
influential figures who contributed to the development of the "realm of
secular power as having its own norms and justifications." Maclntyre
(1966:127, 123-24) goes so far as to describe Machiavelli as the "Luther of
secular power," arguing that Luther "bifurcated morality; there are on the

one hand the absolutely unquestionable commandments, which are, so far
as human reasons and desires are concerned, arbitrary and contextless,
and on the other hand, there are the self-justifying rules of the political and
economic order."

Luther does sound "Machiavellian" with his insistence on two morali-

ties, and does sound "Bonhoefferian"; his emphasis on human sinfulness
may remind readers of category two. But I think that his acceptance of
different standards for the public official and for the individual Christian,

and his description of a two kingdoms theory place him in my theological
model three. Martin Luther describes the world as divided into two

kingdoms, both created by God and both good. One is the secular realm,
and one is the spiritual realm. A different rule applies to each kingdom.
The spiritual world is ruled by the Sermon on the Mount, while the secular

world is ruled by the Mosaic Law. For Luther, the principles of the gospel
do not have a social significance. But this does not mean that Christians
should avoid participation in the secular world. Luther believes that the
state is a necessary component of human life in which Christians must
participate. At times, the function of the state requires actions that are not
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acceptable to individual morality. The state does not and cannot act out of
individual motives of love. For Luther, however, its official activities in
pursuit of power can be justified (see Luther, 1961a).
Luther argues (1961b:94), ". . . [O]ne must distinguish among men. For
men can be classified either as public or private individuals." Public
officials have a necessary function to judge and to punish evil men. Their
deeds, even the killing of other humans, are justified because the public
official acts as God's servant. In contrast, private individuals who desire
vengeance must do so through the public representative of God.
And yet, the Christian politician is not left without limits, cannot be left
uninfluenced by the claims of individual morality. Luther urges the prince

to service of the people, rather than domination. "In such manner should a
prince in his heart empty himself of his power and authority and take unto

himself the needs of his subjects, dealing with them as though they were
his own needs. For this is what Christ did to us; and these are the proper

works of Christian love" (Althaus, 1972:122). The importance of the

influence of Christian love is evident as well in Luther's insistence on the

need for ministers to preach to rulers about the word of God, reminding
rulers that they must "subject themselves to the word of God" (Althaus,
1972:147). For "the political office is limited not by the inherent independence of the ecclesiastical office but by the authority of the word of God"

(Althaus, 1972:148). And the word of God, once again, always serves to
remind the ruler that he should be of service.

A contemporary representative of this model's separation between
private and public spheres of morality is Reinhold Niebuhr, especially the
Niebuhr of Moral Man and Immoral Society. In the opening paragraph of
the book's introduction, Niebuhr claims: ". . . [A] sharp distinction must
be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of

social groups . . . This distinction justifies and necessitates political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing"
(Niebuhr, 1932:xi). Niebuhr bases his argument on the differences between individuals and groups. Individuals are capable of sacrificing their
own interests in order to work unselfishly for the welfare of other people.

They can make conscious decisions to proceed altruistically and to control
their inclinations to do otherwise. In contrast, individuals working within

groups are confronted by the phenomenon of collective egoism. The
group, unlike the individual, cannot guide and control its impulses and its
selfish desires. The group, in order to reconcile the conflicting interests of
the individuals who inhabit it, works for its own interests.
It may be possible, though it is never easy, to establish just relations between
individuals within a group purely by moral and rational suasion and accom-

modation. In intergroup relations this is practically an impossibility. The
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relations between groups must therefore always be predominantly political
rather than ethical, that is, they will be determined by the proportion of
power which each group possesses at least as much as by any rational and
moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group. The
coercive factors, in distinction to the more purely moral and rational factors,
in political relations can never be sharply differentiated and defined.
(Niebuhr, 1932:xxii)

Niebuhr asserts the importance of two separate realms because of his
perception of the realities of power. It is power which controls the secular
and political world. It is those who have power who are able to abuse the
rights of others and to commit injustices. Niebuhr believes that the only
way in which this type of power can be thwarted is through the use of
power.

Because of the realities of power and of group relationships, the individ-

ual who represents the collectivity is also allowed to determine his actions
by standards other than those used by the individual in a non-public role.
The politician is "the incarnation of a raison d'etat" (Niebuhr, 1978:10).
Niebuhr provides two criteria for the politician's moral decision-making.
First, do the proposed methods do justice to every human moral capacity?
Second, do they take account of human limitations? Niebuhr opposes the
idea of moral absolutes in the realm of political action. He considers no
social policy, not even the use of violence, as intrinsically evil Instead, it is
the consequences of the action which matter, and which must be carefully
weighed and measured.
The realm of politics is a twilight zone where ethical and technical issues
meet. A political policy cannot be intrinsically evil if it can be proved to be
an efficacious instrument for the achievement of a morally approved end.
Neither can it be said to be wholly good merely because it seems to make for
ultimately good consequences. Immediate consequences must be weighed
against the ultimate consequences . . . whether the ultimate good, which is
hoped to be accomplished by this immediate destruction, justifies the sacrifice is a question which depends upon many considerations for its answer.
(Niebuhr, 1932:171; see also, on Gandhi, Niebuhr, 1932: 240-56)

Niebuhr insists on a relationship between public and individual morality, although that relationship is frequently ambiguous. At one point, he
argues that individual morality must be retained for its important influence

on group morality. He claims that the two moralities are not mutually
exclusive. The public official needs to have moral insights and to develop a
moral outlook on her behavior, and the best source of this outlook is an
individual morality. If the individual is to cultivate her own moral discipline while working in groups, some fusion between the two moralities is
necessary.13
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At the same time, however, Niebuhr insists that parts of the two ethics

are irreconcilable. The two moralities do have a different focus, and
individual morality must at times be disregarded.
From the perspective of society, the highest moral ideal is justice. From the
perspective of the individual the highest ideal is unselfishness. Society must
strive for justice even if it is forced to use means, such as self-assertion,
resistance, coercion and perhaps resentment, which cannot gain the moral
sanction of the most sensitive moral spirit. (Niebuhr, 1932:257)

Niebuhr claims that every attempt to transfer individual disinterestedness
to group activities has failed. Because of this, a strong sense of religious
idealism is not applicable to the realistic world of politics. Religious and
political morality can never be equated, and the attempt to harmonize the
morality of the two spheres destroys the effectiveness of both.
Whenever religious idealism brings forth its purest fruits and places the
strongest check upon selfish desire it results in policies which, from the
political perspective, are quite impossible. There is, in other words, no
possibility of harmonising the two strategists [sic] designed to bring the
strongest inner and the most effective social restraint upon egoistic impulse.
It would therefore seem better to accept a frank dualism in morals than to
attempt a harmony between the two methods which threatens the effectiveness of both. (Niebuhr, 1932:271, my emphasis)

Thus, although Niebuhr makes an effort to link public and private morality, his overall emphasis is on the dualism of the two worlds.

How does this ethic relate to Christianity, and what prevents it from
being entirely a "Machiavellian" ethic? Niebuhr retains, first of all, a
concern for the influence of individual morality upon social morality. What
is significant for Niebuhr as well is his retention of love as well as justice in
his ethic. WTiile all humans can hope to achieve in this world is justice, the

importance of love is never denied. Love remains as an "impossible
possibility" offering the chance of limitation on certain human actions.
WTiat remains frequently unclear in Niebuhr's writings, of course, is how
these bounds are known, and how they are established (see Niebuhr,
1976:232-37).
A passage from Richard Fox's biography of Reinhold Niebuhr illustrates this difference between the theological model of Martin Luther and
Reinhold Niebuhr and the neoclassical model of Michael Walzer. Fox

describes Niebuhr's opposition to the 1962 senate campaign of Edward
Kennedy and to John Kennedy's "sexual capers" while president. Fox
argues that Niebuhr was opposed to these activities because
there were firm - if ill-defined - limits to Niebuhr's realism. The responsible
statesman did have to dirty his hands in the pursuit of justice. But without
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personal probity a politician lost sight of justice, which was the social
correlate of individual fair-dealing. Kennedy's cynicism was Machiavellian,
not Niebuhrian. Niebuhr frequently had to insist that his secular admirers
were turning his realism into a world-weary manipulativeness that verged on

moral nihilism. (Fox, 1985:277, my emphasis)

When Hans Morgenthau, according to Fox, doubted that "one could be
both 'a successful politician and a good Christian,'" Niebuhr corrected

him:

The Christian politician was the one who engaged in the statesmanlike
compromises that a sinful world demanded, but who relentlessly subjected
his actions to the test of the standard of justice. The Christian leader made
use of the world's methods but did not resign himself to the world's ways. He
cultivated an uneasy conscience - not merely a matter of breast-beating but
of real self-criticism. His career was a perennial struggle, personal and
political, to bring justice to bear in human relations. Politics was therefore
not Morgenthau's realm of "amorality," but a sphere of "moral ambiguity."
(Fox, 1985:277; see also Frankel, 1978; Olafson, 1973)

Moral ambiguity and a dual morality - and yet not, I think, the moral
anguish illustrated in the second category.

COMMON MORALITY

My fourth and final category is the common morality position
fourth model argues that there is one morality for the private citiz
for the politician. It can, like the first model, include a deontolog
argument that prohibits certain actions as intrinsically evil. Unlike the
model, however, it allows for the possibility of compromise with
admits that there are times in which the public official must unde
seemingly evil actions - killing, punishment, torture, lying, the
violence - but so must the private individual. It argues that the pol
can be both moral and effective, but that there are limits to the g
efficacy. We have seen that there could be such limits in category
but the common morality position establishes these limits more pre
And because this model offers an ethical system which can respond
moral dilemmas of both the private citizen and the public official, it ar
that the politician's hands can remain clean.
One philosopher who responds explicitly to Walzer's argument is
Donagan, who in his The Theory of Morality rejects the concept of
hands as inconsistent with "common morality" - "the part of com
morality according to the Hebrew-Christian tradition which does
depend on any theistic belief" (Donagan, 1977:29). 14 Donagan belie
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that if separate moral rules exist for politicians, common morality has
failed, and he argues against "the proposition that the political goods that
matter, liberty, prosperity, and peace, can only be procured by courses of
action which involve grave violations of common morality, if not in the use

of power, then in its acquisition" (Donagan, 1977:184). Donagan rejects as
well a consequentialist approach to the problem. He reminds his readers
that the fact the good has resulted from evil actions does not mean that it

could not also have resulted from good actions. "That good has come
about through crime does not show that it could only have come about
through crime" (Donagan, 1977:185). Donagan also believes that historians and philosophers have concentrated on the good results of crime
while neglecting all the long-range evil results.
No philosophy of history has produced any evidence worth the name either
that, in the long run, any great political good could only have come about
through barbarous or oppressive means, or that the barbarous and oppressive actions without which some political goods would not have come
about have not also brought about compensating evils. (Donagan, 1977:185)

As an example of his reasoning, Donagan argues that the evidence does
not support a conclusion for torture in the case Walzer considers. The
agent must first consider all other available options, such as an intensive
search for the explosives. Even if finally the torture becomes expedient,
Donagan claims that common morality can respond to this situation by
asking if the prisoner satisfies the conditions for immunity to violence.
Common morality can assert that this prisoner has violated his right to
immunity from torture because he has endangered the lives of others. The

morality which responds to private individuals can resolve this case; a
separate public morality is unnecessary. "And so the problem of dirty
hands dissolves. It arises from a twofold sentimentalization: of politics,
imagining it as an arena in which moral heroes take hard (that is, immoral)

decisions for the good of us all; and of common morality, ignoring the
conditions it places on the immunities it proclaims" (Donagan, 1977:189;
see also Howard, 1977; and see Little, 1978, for an argument against
Niebuhr's two moralities).
In the Christian tradition, an illustration of the arguments of the fourth

model can be found in twentieth century Roman Catholic discussions of
moral theology. Some sense of the argument proposed by this tradition
can be gained from John XXIII's description of political life in Pacem in
Terris.

The same moral law which governs relations between individual human
beings serves also to regulate the relations of political communities with one
another.
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This will be readily understood when one reflects that the individual representatives of political communities cannot put aside their personal dignity
while they are acting in the name and interest of their countries; and that
they cannot therefore violate the very law of their being, which is the moral
law.

It would be absurd, moreover, even to imagine that men could surrender
their own human attributes, or be compelled to do so, by the fact of their
appointment to public office. On the contrary, they have been given that
noble assignment precisely because the wealth of their human endowments
has earned them their reputation as outstanding members of the body
politic.
Furthermore, authority is a necessary requirement of the moral order in
human society. It may not therefore be used against that order; the very
instant such an attempt were made, it would cease to be authority.
... a fundamental factor of the common good is acknowledgement of the
moral order and respect for its prescriptions (Gremillion, 1976:218-19, my
emphasis).

In this document, John XXIII does not provide the full argument which
explains Roman Catholic understandings of political morality. But it is
worth noting that Pacem in Terris is heavily dependent upon a natural law
method, an approach highly favored in traditional Roman Catholic moral
theology.

Among the tools which permit John XXIII to argue as he does, and
which persuade the Roman Catholic tradition of moral theology to allow
individuals some moral compromise with evil, are two principles central to
the tradition, the principle of double effect and the principle of cooperation. What these principles provide, in general, is a way of distinguishing
between intrinsic evil (evil which can never be directly done, under any
circumstances) and nonmoral or premoral or ontic evil (evil which can be
allowed, if certain conditions are met) (for a discussion of these terms, see
Curran and McCormick, 1979). The moral argumentation of this category
thus allows - as the first category does - for absolute prohibitions in Christian ethics - but it defines them differently, drawing the line in a different

place.
While I cannot rehearse at this point all of the arguments about contemporary formulations and reformulations of the principles of double effect
and cooperation based on new ways of understanding the concepts of
intrinsic evil and proportionate reason, the classical statements of the
principles are in themselves still helpful to our problem of dirty hands.

What the principle of double effect argues is that sometimes human
actions have two effects, one good and one evil. The causation of the evil
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effect need not prohibit the moral agent from undertaking that action,
providing certain conditions be met:

1. The action, considered by itself and independently of its effects,
must not be morally evil.
2. The evil effects must not be the means of producing the good effect.

3. The evil effect is sincerely not intended, but merely tolerated.
4. There must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in
spite of its evil consequences. (Kelly, 1958:13-14)

Closely related to the principle of double effect, and receiving less
attention in the discussion of moral principles in contemporary Roman
Catholic moral theology, is the principle most pertinent to our discussion,
the principle of cooperation. Cooperation means "concurrence with another person in an act that is morally wrong" (Healy, 1956:101). The
tradition distinguishes between "formal" and "material" cooperation with
evil. Formal cooperation occurs when one
1 . acts with another in performing an external act that is morally wrong
in itself, or
2. performs a morally indifferent act, but does so with the intention of

helping another in a morally wrong action, and with the approval of
the other's action. (Healy, 1956:102)
One could never, of course, undertake an action that was intrinsically evil.
On the other hand, material cooperation is "that in which, without
approving another's wrongdoing, one helps him perform his evil action by
an act which is not of its nature morally wrong" (Healy, 1956:103); it is
"concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention

with which it is done" (Slater, 1908:203). Material cooperation is permitted
when one has a proportionate reason for so acting. For example, one could
cooperate in a burglary, if the robber holds a gun to her head. The reason
for this is that "charity does not impose an obligation when the cost or
burden is out of proportion to the good that will result" (Healy, 1942:45);
"charity does not bind with grave inconvenience" (Connell, 1953:93).
Decisions about whether an action is permitted, once it is defined as
material rather than formal cooperation, depend upon the discernment of
what "proportionate reason" means. The discussion of material cooperation establishes criteria which could help one to decide if the cooperation
were permitted. For example, it matters if the individual's action would be

very proximate, less proximate, or remote relative to the evil deed. If the
first, only very grave reasons would allow for cooperation; if the second,
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grave reasons would suffice; if the third, slight reasons would be sufficient.15 The analysis is affected as well by the responsibilities accorded to
one's station in life.

This division of levels of cooperation and the difficulty of discerning
which actions fell into which categories led Henry Davis to observe
(1946:342), "Great varieties of opinion therefore, on any given case except
the most obvious, are inevitable, and there is no more difficult question
than this in the whole range of Moral Theology."
Most of the explication of the meaning of formal and material cooperation occurs in case analysis; the conditions of cooperation are usually
illustrated with examples. Many of these center on medical ethical questions of cooperation with "evil" procedures and employees' participation
in actions commanded by an employer (usually the servant commanded to
undertake an "evil" action). But a number of the manuals do note that, in
the political sphere, Catholic public officials could cooperate in the enforcement of unjust laws, or could compromise with opponents in indifferent political matters, to bring about a good election or a good law. It is
the principle of cooperation which helps explain, for example, "how a
legislator can vote for a law which Catholic ethics might consider permissive of an immoral action; how public authorities can execute such a
law" (Dailey, 1970: 165). 16 In undertaking these actions, guided by formal
and material cooperation, of course, politicians are always acting morally,
with clean hands.

Elements for such a "clean hands" approach to political morality can
be found as well in the writings of the Catholic whose reflections on the
United States political system so greatly influenced Roman Catholic political theory. John Courtney Murray, too, depends on the natural law
approach favored by Donagan, John XXIII, and the Roman Catholic
tradition of moral theology, proclaiming indeed the "eternal return of
natural law" (Murray, 1960:295).
In an essay on morality and foreign policy, Murray argues that the
problem with discussions about a moral foreign policy is that there is no
agreement about what morality is. Murray rejects two theories of morality

which he sees as characteristic of the American (and Protestant) debate
and which are reminiscent of the models discussed above. The older

morality was voluntarist, scriptural, individualistic, subjectivist, it offered

absolute precepts and was based on a morality of intention. Its promotion
of "Christian perfection as a social standard," Murray argues (1960:277
left it with "no resources for discriminating moral judgment" on politica
questions. The new morality which has replaced and rejected it is situa
tional, pragmatist, consequentialist; above all it sees moral life as ambigu
ous; it "teaches that to act is to sin, to accept responsibility is to incur
guilt" (Murray, 1960:277-78).
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Both moralities, according to Murray, pose three problems. First, they
allow for a gulf between individual and collective morality. Second, they
recognize that nations act out of self-interest, but condemn self-interest as

immoral. Third (and most important for the problem of dirty hands),
neither morality deals effectively with power.

For Murray, the problem with American moral thought is that it views
power as evil. Because of this, Americans have not wanted to make use of
instruments of power (their "hands," for Murray). They have wanted to act

with "clean" hands, but actually with no hands, since if power is always
evil, any use of it involves the nation in guilt.
We have never wanted to have such hands, much less to get them dirty by
handling any history save our own. . . . Now we have become suddenly
conscious of our hands - that they are sinewy beyond comparison; that they
are sunk in the affairs of the world; that they are getting dirty beyond the
wrists.

At least we feel them to be dirty, and the feeling is one of guilt (Murray,
1960:281).

Possibilities for a morality of power are further weakened by those who
argue that "to refuse to use power is to be 'irresponsible,' and therefore to
be more guilty yet" (Murray, 1960:282).
Murray rejects this moral language. He employs the analogy of a
surgeon (an interesting choice, given the Roman Catholic tradition's heavy
emphasis on medical questions to describe formal and material cooperation) to make his point. In the midst of surgery, a surgeon does not speak
of paradox, irony, dilemma, or above all, of ambiguity, even if aspects of
the surgery could be viewed as such. Instead, Murray argues that "complicated situations, surgical or moral, are merely complicated. It is for the
statesman, as for the surgeon, to master the complications and minister as
best he can to the health of the body, politic or physical" (Murray,
1960:284).
Murray rejects, therefore, the language of ambiguity, turning instead to
the natural law tradition, the "tradition of reason" (Murray, 1960:285).
That tradition can span the gap between individual and collective morality; it can evaluate self-interest (in certain forms) as morally appropriate;
and it can discern moral uses of power. It does so by teleological reasoning which distinguishes between force and violence, for "force is morally
neutral in itself" (Murray, 1960:288). Murray admits (1960:288) that the
"casuistry is endlessly difficult," but the tradition of reason can nonetheless resolve such problems.
Clean hands are possible in the fourth category, therefore, for guilt does
not attach to persons who undertake actions with proportionate reason,
which permit some evil but which are not evil in themselves.
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ROMAN CATHOLIC POLITICAL ETHICS: CLEAN AND DIRTY
HANDS?

What are the implications of the existence of these models for Christi
ethics, and specifically for the contemporary discussion of political m
ity in Roman Catholic moral theology? The most obvious point to
about them is that they remind us of the significant differences in eth
arguments proposed by different Christian writers and serve agai
highlight the difficulty of finding points of agreement in Christian eth
While some Christians hope that common ground in Christian ethic
be found in ethical practice, if not in ethical theory, the categorie
response to the problem of dirty hands do not provide immediate ho

agreement in the sphere of action, for they differ not only in method, b

conclusions on substantive issues. The most striking of these, of cour
the contrast between the first model's absolute prohibition of violenc

the allowance of violence by the other three. But even in their
acceptance of the use of violence, the differences among the last t
models could still result in different practices. To Niebuhr, for example

for Walzer) it matters if the politician possesses some kind of

wardness," some type of personal morality - some commitment to
impossible ideal of love. For that might provide some restriction on
actions as a public official, restrictions which the second category m
not provide. Again, recent debates among American Catholics abou
morality of deterrence policy and of first use of nuclear weapons de
strate that a stance which ultimately offers an absolute prohibitio
against direct killing of the innocent - may differ significantly fro
ethic which is primarily consequentialist in approach.
Let me step back for a moment from these broader questions ab
Christian ethics to a more specific discussion of the implications of

models for Roman Catholic political morality. It seems to me, for examp

that Roman Catholic politicians reckoning with abortion (the polit

issue receiving the most sustained debate in recent years by Ro

Catholic politicians), but also with nuclear policy and questions of
nomic justice, need to reflect seriously on the distinctions between
moral anguish and common morality positions, and between the du

morality and the common morality positions. The common morality mod
rejects arguments that there is a split between private and public morali

that the politician is obliged by her office to do something immor

other words, it rejects the concept of dirty hands. It is difficult from w

that position, therefore, to countenance language by Catholic politic
which suggests that their personal convictions contradict their pu
positions. Nor is it helpful when such politicians use language sugge
that they are obligated by their professional lives to undertake imm
actions which their personal consciences abhor (e.g., Cuomo, 1984;
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McBrien, 1987:133-68, for an analysis of the Cuomo and Ferraro statements).

The common morality position, however, does not obligate politicians
to vote for legislation with which they disagree, even on these difficult
issues. Part of that is due to the fact that politicians need to exercise
"prudential judgment" as legislators, a point well made by Mario Cuomo
and others. But part of that "prudential judgment" requires a more detailed analysis of the classical principle of cooperation with evil. Part of
the argument of that principle, of course, is the reminder that politicians
are not necessarily guilty when they vote for a law with which they
disagree. Backing that principle as well is an argument that both public
and private individuals undertake processes of prudential judgment when
they confront difficult problems in personal as well as professional life. The

principles of cooperation and double effect are accessible to private individuals as well as public representatives, and thus there cannot be two
moralities.

How can further reflection on cooperation with evil aid current discussions of political morality? First, for example, a major stumbling block in
using the principle of cooperation to allow for votes supporting funding of

abortion appears to be that direct abortion is defined as intrinsically evil.
(In 1959, a different issue provoked a similar concern, when a Catholic
moral theologian asked what type of cooperation would be involved if a
Catholic president signed laws permitting contraceptive programs; see
Connery, 1959:353-54.) But there is at present a great deal of questioning
of the concept of intrinsic evil by Christian ethicists. That debate needs to

be reflected in contemporary discussions and definitions of the difference
between formal and material cooperation with evil.
Second, for example, when the moral manuals present cases of material
cooperation with evil (usually the nurse participating in a surgical procedure), they frequently suggest the need for the person to express some
disapproval of the action being undertaken, even if she does eventually
cooperate with the procedure. Here the "I'm personally opposed to abortion but" language of a number of Catholic politicians could be subject to
a more positive interpretation. That is, such language might not be illustrative of a dual morality, but might express the fact that certain
political actions are undertaken as forms of material cooperation. Here
also can be valued the conviction of some Catholic politicians (even those
who vote for abortion funding) that they should work to remove the social
conditions which make unwanted pregnancy possible and abortion desirable. There is a positive moral interpretation, therefore, which can be
placed on the language of personal opposition to the evils with which one
is allowed to cooperate.
However, if thoughtful Catholic politicians do continue to find in their
experience that their private and public consciences contradict one an-
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other, it may be that the "common morality" position so defended by
Donagan and Murray, and so basic to the Roman Catholic tradition of
moral theology, may not correspond to the reality of the public official's
life. If common morality - the natural law approach- fails, then Roman
Catholics face a profound question about their understanding of Christian
ethics. They would need to ask themselves: do we need to remain moral,
to keep our private consciences intact, by accepting the arguments of
model one about political involvement? Or should we move to affirm the
reality of what Dietrich Bonhoeffer or Reinhold Niebuhr stated about
political life? The move toward another model could result not only in a
new attitude toward Christian political morality but in different political
practices as well. Ethicists need to learn at this point from the moral
experience of politicians themselves.

There is a second topic in contemporary Roman Catholic political
ethics for which these categories possess interesting implications. That is,
there are members of the Roman Catholic community who are prohibited
from becoming politicians, namely, priests and members of religious communities. There are many reasons for this, and I cannot do full justice to
the arguments surrounding this exclusion here.17 But the prohibition is
interesting in relationship to the models which I have sketched. It would
be easy, for example, to understand why priests and religious should not
participate in the political life according to models two and three, for
politics is a "dirty" business to the Niebuhrs and the Bonhoeffers of the
tradition. On the fourth model, priests and members of religious communities might need to cooperate with evil but could remain moral agents in
their cooperation. However, even this is not permitted to them; they are
regulated instead, it seems, by the framework of the first model. This is not
surprising, since there is in the Catholic tradition a history of talking about
two moralities, or at least two different callings in life, one of them guided
by the counsels of perfection. There is precedent, for example, in thinking
about the clerical life as sectarian within a church tradition. But that

precedent should force Catholics to ask themselves how the perspectives
of models one and four can be held together, with consistency. It should

lead them to consider anew - and with serious attention - the claims of

model one about political morality.
We should remember, however, that while there are variations within
the sectarian model itself, in theory it can allow for some participation in
the political realm, if that participation can be regulated by the demands of
obedience to Jesus Christ. What needs to be made clearer are the reasons
why that level of participation should differ for clergy and for laity, since in

Catholicism all participation in the political realm must be guided by
fidelity to moral principles.
There may be all kinds of legitimate reasons for the exclusion of priests
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and members of religious communities from elective political office, reasons which we cannot examine here. There could be, for example, very
practical reasons based on the shortage of priests and religious and the
need to confine their activity to ecclesiastical functions. There are as well
arguments from the counsels of perfection, arguments about the holiness
of the lifestyle of priests and religious, or about the spiritual witness which

they offer to church and world. Questions of competence and of church
unity are significant as well.

But the various answers to the problem of dirty hands, I think, force
Catholics to be more precise about the morality of clergy and religious.
What is it about the morality of religious life and of political life which
brings the two into conflict? Does participation in political life, for example, violate the counsels of perfection? Is there a conflict between the
duties of holiness and the duties of morality? Can one perhaps be a moral
politician, but not a holy one? And if so, was Max Weber right to contrast
the politician and the saint? If there are, in fact, two moralities within
Catholic political ethics, what does that say about the validity of a natural

law foundation for Christian ethics?

At the heart of the Catholic tradition is an argument that persons in
general - and politicians specifically - should not dirty their hands. But
the contemporary descriptions by Catholic politicians of their political
activity, and the exclusion of certain Catholics from elective political
office, demonstrate that other models of analysis - models from other
segments of the Christian tradition - are present in their arguments as
well. Further clarity, therefore, about the morality of politics, and about
the relationship between holiness and morality, is necessary before Catholics, in union with other Christians and with philosophers and politicians
in general, can answer the question, "Can politicians be moral?"

NOTES

1. Walzer (1978), Nagel (1972), Brandt (1972), and Hare (1972) discuss
whether or not a person could face a situation in which she must choose between
two courses of action, both of which are wrong. That same question is implicit in
the discussion of my categories. For further treatment of this "conflict of duties"
question, see Kant, 1964; Gowans, 1987.
2. Walzer's concern is similar to Bernard Williams' discussion of reluctance

among politicians. Sometimes politicians must undertake actions that are morally
disagreeable, but Williams argues that "... only those who are reluctant or
disinclined to do the morally disagreeable when it is really necessary have much
chance of not doing it when it is not necessary" (1978:64).
3. For an informative philosophical analysis of attitudes toward politics which
differs from Walzer's, see Langan, 1985:127:48.
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It is important to note that Walzer et al. 's discussion of political morality is
dependent on their assessment of moral rules. Christian ethicists discussing politi-

cal morality should pay attention to the debate about rules and Christian love
provoked by Fletcher, 1966, and discussed in, e.g., Ramsey, 1967, and Outka, 1972.
One could attempt to link my own categories with those of pure-act agapism,
summary rule agapism, pure rule agapism, and combinations of rule and act
agapism. There are, e.g., some similarities between moral purity and pure rule;
moral anguish and pure act; dual morality and summary rule; and common
morality and combination. It would not be helpful, I think, to try to push the two
categories together, and an attempt to do so would only confirm the weakness of
typologies. What is important is to recognize that some understanding of the status
of moral norms is central to each category.
4. While some persons, including Hoederer, use the term "moral purity" in a
pejorative sense, it should not be so interpreted here. The same caution applies to
the use of the word "sectarian" to describe this position; "sectarian," as John
Howard Yoder rightly notes, should be interpreted in its "non-pejorative technical
sense" (1984:6).
5. The image of clean and dirty hands is a problematical one for the Christian
discussion of political morality. The acceptance of some degree of human sinfulness in all four models makes it inexact to speak of totally "clean" hands. While
it would be interesting to note the relationship between conceptions of sinfulness
and the morality proposed in each of these models, I will not be able to focus on
that topic in this article. And I will continue to employ the clean/dirty hands, using
it to express not the sinfulness which attaches to human actions, but the moral
guilt which attaches to the agent undertaking the activity. Gustafson, (1978),
provides a helpful analysis of the different attitudes toward sin which characterize
the Christian tradition. He demonstrates as well how the Roman Catholic tradi-

tion, even with a concept of sinfulness, can allow for 1) moral guilt and moral
innocence; and 2) the possibility of a morally good choice, even when the agent is
confronted with her sinfulness (1978:7-10). The existence of differences of opinion
among Christians about the relationship of sinfulness and moral guilt is crucial to
my categories.
6. The same absolute prohibition against lying is offered by Immanuel Kant,
who, in a now infamous example, affirms that persons should not lie, even if the
murderer standing on your doorstep asks if his victim is in your house, and you
know that the victim is upstairs (Kant, 1978:285-90). Dietrich Bonhoeffer (one
exemplar of my second model) responds specifically to Kant's treatment of the
lying case.
7. Yoder provides as well a very helpful analysis of the different outlooks
toward the state in the Christian tradition.

8. One should not let this description of Yoder's ethic camouflage the positive
requirements of Christian life that he discusses throughout his work. See Yoder,
1984:118; 1972:98-100; 1964:44.
9. In his book, What Would You Do? (i.e., what would you do if someone
attacked a member of your family), he describes a situation of physical attack in
which it is possible that the ethic of non-resistance could bring about the best
consequences. See Yoder, 1985.
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10. Here, unlike Walzer, I combine internal guilt and external sanctions in one
category. One of the reasons for this is that Walzer and I have different understand-

ings of the Catholic position.
11. Shklar calls into question the Machiavellian approach and the Weberian
approach, arguing that the "simple choice that Weber inherited from Machiavelli
between a mere two rules, immoral politics and moral privacy, does not make
much sense in a liberal democratic state. . . . His [Weber's] were the politics of the
great gesture, and they still appeal to those engaged intellectuals who like to think
of 'dirty hands' as a peculiarly shaking, personal, and spectacular crisis. This is a
fantasy quite appropriate to the imaginary world, in which these people see
themselves in full technicolor. Stark choices and great decisions are actually very
rare in politics" (Shklar, 1984:243).
But Shklar's analysis shows as well the difficulties of the dirty hands categories,
for while Shklar insists that one cannot completely separate out public from
private morality - for "what we look for both in public officials and in our friends is

character" - she argues that "as social actors, we all have unclean hands some of
the time" (Shklar, 1984:243).
12. I am indebted to Drew Christiansen S.J. for the choice of Bonhoeffer as a

representative of this model.
Another possible choice for this category might be Emil Brunner, who at times
echoes the morality /immorality language of this category. At times, Brunner
argues, the Christian must go against her conscience: "If the Christian's 'official
duty' causes pain and perplexity to his conscience, it must simply be endured. The
Divine Command is terribly distorted when difficulties of conscience created by
the 'official order' are evaded by setting up a double morality" (Brunner, 1937:222,
460-63).

13. It is this same understanding of morality which is behind his criticism of
both orthodoxy and liberalism (Niebuhr, 1935). Niebuhr criticizes Christian orthodoxy for its willingness to accept too much from the ruler or from the government;
Christian history has often accepted evil rulers as part of God's punishment. But he
criticizes Christian liberalism as well, for its "sentimental illusions," its "gay and
easy confidence" and its "perfectionism." The resolution of the problem lies
somewhere in between - in Christian realism. This realism does not negate the
importance of individual morality, however.
14. It is from Donagan that I take the name of this fourth model. He responds
as well to Brandt, Hare and Nagel. While Donagan's is not an explicitly Christian
argument, he depends upon the Judaeo-Christian tradition (and specifically upon
St. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant) as part of the background to his writing.
15. A number of different terms are used to indicate levels of material cooperation, including also immediate and mediate, positive and negative, etc. Treatments
of these categories can be found in the works cited above; cf. Dailey, 1970:163-66;
Davis, 1946:341-52; Koch, 1924:39-46; McHugh and Callan, 1958:615-41.
16. Dailey, 1970:165. For further examples of cooperation in political activity,

see McHugh & Callan, 1958:627 (on compromise with opponents) and Koch,
1924 : 43 (on cooperation with unjust laws). For an excellent contemporary analysis of

formal and material cooperation, see McCormick, 1984.
17. I treat these themes in detail in "The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal:

This content downloaded from 131.216.14.2 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 18:31:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

58 The Journal of Religious Ethics
Roman Catholic Church-State Theory" (Griffin, 1987). See also Kolbenschlag,
1985 and 1986.
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